The article is originally published on the website of International Center for Law and Religion Studies. Available here.

 

Nikolay Hovhannisyan, a senior program manager at EPF, shared his take on the status of conscientious objection in Armenia, focusing on its legislative framework, major legal cases, and ongoing challenges in fully realizing this right․

 

The right to conscientious objection to military service is recognized under international law as a facet of the broader right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Although not an independent right, conscientious objection is considered an inherent part of these fundamental freedoms, as articulated in key international instruments. Regionally, Europe has been particularly progressive in codifying this right, exemplified by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has set significant legal standards for the recognition of conscientious objection. Under the ECHR, the right to conscientious objection is based on Articles 9 and 4.[1] It was first examined by the ECtHR in Thlimmenos v. Greece (2000), decades after an initial review by the European Commission of Human Rights in Grandrath v. Germany (1966). In its latest decision, on 12 March 2024, the ECtHR in Kanatlı v. Turkey clarified that the right extends to refusal of reserve military service, expanding the understanding of conscientious objection.

 

 

The Armenian Legislative Framework and Key Legal Cases: Bayatyan and Beyond

In Armenia, military service is governed by the Law on Military Service and Status of Servicemen (2017), which outlines provisions for conscription and military service for men aged 18 to 27. Recent amendments in 2023 also allow women to voluntarily serve for a limited period (Law on Military Service, Article 5). Armenia’s alternative to compulsory military service is regulated by the Alternative Service Law (2013), which offers two options: alternative military service within the Armed Forces without bearing arms and alternative civilian service outside the Armed Forces.

 

Historically, Armenia’s legislative framework for conscientious objection has been fraught with challenges. Prior to 2004, no legal provisions allowed for conscientious objection, leading to the imprisonment of many objectors, particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses. Between 1985 and 2012, more than 450 Jehovah’s Witnesses were imprisoned due to their refusal to serve in the military.

 

Armenia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 2001 came with the commitment to establish alternative civilian service, resulting in the Alternative Service Act of 2004. However, this law initially allowed military authorities to oversee the program, undermining its civilian nature. Subsequent amendments in 2006 introduced punitive measures that compromised its status as a genuine alternative to military service.

 

A major turning point for conscientious objection in Armenia came with the ECtHR’s ruling in Bayatyan v. Armenia(2011), which recognized conscientious objection as protected under Article 9 of the ECHR. Vahan Bayatyan, a Jehovah’s Witness, refused military service in 2001 due to his religious beliefs, and Armenia was found in violation of Article 9 for failing to respect his right to conscientious objection. The Bayatyan ruling set a significant precedent, pressuring Armenia to reform its legal framework. This was followed by additional rulings in Bukharatyan v. Armenia and Tsaturyan v. Armenia in 2012, further reinforcing the ECtHR’s stance on conscientious objection. These rulings led to amendments to the Alternative Service Law in 2013, facilitating the release of several imprisoned conscientious objectors and a more robust process for recognizing alternative service applications.

 

However, despite these legal advancements, challenges remain. While Jehovah’s Witnesses have experienced few to no issues accessing alternative service since 2013, members of other religious groups continue to face obstacles.

 

 

Unrecognized Conscientious Objectors

Individuals who are denied conscientious objector status may face criminal penalties, similar to objectors who are granted such status but refuse alternative service and objectors who live in countries that do not recognize conscientious objection. In Armenia, these sanctions constitute imprisonment.[2]

 

Generally speaking, the granting of conscientious objector status is based on a determination that the objector’s claimed beliefs are sincere; such a determination poses a challenge, as someone who appears sincere may be driven by fear rather than conscience. Given the fact that no such challenges have been recorded with Jehovah’s Witnesses in Armenia suggests that religious beliefs are the most commonly, or the only, accepted basis for granting exemption. This is a troubling implication—that, despite the law’s wording, Armenian authorities treat conscientious objection not as an individual right based on personal beliefs but as dependent on membership in a particular denomination. This treatment has led to the imprisonment of several objectors to date.

 

In the most recent case, Davit Nazaretyan, a member of the unregistered Council of Churches Baptist congregation in Yerevan, was denied access to alternative civilian service. The case has been well followed through, and well articulated by, FoRB groups and human rights organizations. On 25 October 2023, the Kentron District Court in Yerevan sentenced Nazaretyan to two years in prison for refusing both compulsory military service and alternative service. Despite filing unsuccessful appeals, on 20 August 2024 he was taken to Nubarashen Prison to serve his two-year sentence for refusing military service, and in early September, he was transferred to Sevan Prison. His case illustrates the broader challenge of determining the sincerity of conscientious objection claims, particularly when the objector is not part of a recognized religious denomination.

 

The responsibility for determining the merits of claims for conscientious objector status typically lies with the body overseeing military induction. In the case of Nazaretyan, the Republican Committee was tasked with this role. Their responsibility is twofold: first, to assess whether the applicant’s objection meets the statutory criteria, and second, to determine the sincerity of the applicant’s conscientious objection. The latter involves the challenging task of evaluating the motivations of relatively young individuals, which can be difficult and subjective.

 

In some countries, these oversight commissions are composed primarily of military personnel, an approach that has been widely criticized as resulting in reluctance to acknowledge claims for conscientious objector status.[3] In Armenia, however, the Alternative Service Commission includes government representatives from various ministries and a representative from the Department for Ethnic Minorities and Religious Affairs. While this structure may appear to offer a more diverse perspective, it still raises concerns about the expertise and impartiality of those involved, especially given the complex nature of conscientious objection based on religious or moral beliefs. 

 

 

International Standards and Armenia’s Compliance

The United Nations Human Rights Council, through Resolution 24/17, has commended states that recognize claims of conscientious objection without the need for an inquiry. However, when inquiries are conducted, they must be overseen by an “independent and impartial decision-making body.” International standards further require that conscientious objectors not be discriminated against based on the nature of their beliefs. In Armenia, current practices raise concerns in this regard, particularly due to the lack of expertise on religious and belief systems within the Commission. This issue is compounded by a tendency to give preference to claims made by members of specific religious denominations, notably Jehovah’s Witnesses.

 

In the case of Nazaretyan, the Commission’s reliance on the Yerevan State University’s Department of Theology to evaluate his religious beliefs illustrates the risks of such an approach. The Department’s involvement is problematic for several reasons, particularly because it lacks the independence required for impartial judgments. In 2023, the Department reviewed Nazaretyan’s case and questioned the sincerity of his beliefs, citing inconsistencies in his stated religious affiliation. Furthermore, the faculty selectively interpreted Christian doctrine to challenge his objection to military service, especially his refusal to bear arms. Their conclusion—that Christian doctrine does not inherently oppose warfare or the use of weapons—undermined his conscientious objection claim.

 

This reliance on theological assessments from an institution that may lack impartiality or a thorough understanding of Evangelical-Baptist beliefs raises serious concerns about the fairness of the Commission’s decision. International law stipulates that individuals who are denied recognition as conscientious objectors should not face punishment for refusing to perform or continue military service on the grounds of conscience. Additionally, the unequal treatment of objectors based on their religious affiliation raises issues of discrimination, which violates principles of nondiscrimination embedded in both domestic and international legal frameworks. In the context of conscientious objections, both the Human Rights Committee and the UN Human Rights Council have emphasized the prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief. Since the adoption of General Comment No. 22, the Human Rights Committee has consistently addressed the prohibition on discrimination “among conscientious objectors based on the nature of their specific beliefs.” Additionally, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights sets forth key criteria for assessing applications for conscientious objector status, stressing the significance of ensuring nondiscrimination relative to the grounds for objection or across different groups of objectors.

 

The last known imprisoned conscientious objectors in Armenia, Ivan Mikhailov and Maksim Telegin, both members of the Molokan community, were denied access to alternative civilian service and consequently faced criminal prosecution.[4] Although they were later released, their cases exemplify the challenges and risks faced by individuals denied recognition as conscientious objectors.

 

The lack of proper expertise in handling cases like Nazaretyan’s, where non-mainstream religious beliefs are involved, demonstrates a failure by Armenia to fully comply with international standards. The punishment of objectors based on their conscientious beliefs, including imprisonment, violates fundamental human rights principles.

 

 

Conclusion

Recognizing conscientious objection as a fundamental human right is essential for enhancing the status of objectors, offering stronger protections for their fundamental freedoms, and contributing to the development of a standardized framework that addresses complex issues currently left to the discretion of individual states. For countries like Armenia, which aim to position themselves as champions of democracy in the region, aligning with international human rights standards is vital to enhancing domestic protections. Armenia has made substantial progress over time in recognizing conscientious objection as a human right through legislative reforms and the influence of landmark rulings from the ECtHR. However, significant challenges remain in fully realizing the right to conscientious objection. The continued imprisonment of individuals like Baptist Davit Nazaretyan, reliance on theological assessments by potentially biased institutions, and the lack of nondiscriminatory practices in evaluating objections indicate persistent gaps in Armenia’s approach. To fully align with international human rights standards, Armenia must ensure that all conscientious objectors, regardless of their religion or belief, are treated equitably. This includes reforming decision-making processes to eliminate biases and guaranteeing that no individual is punished for exercising the fundamental right to conscientious objection.

 

 

References:

[1] Article 4.3(b) excludes from the scope of “forced or compulsory labour” prohibited by Article 4.2 “any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service.” See Bayatyan v. Armenia para. 100 (ECtHR Grand Chamber, 7 July 2011) (emphasis added).

[2] Conscientious objectors who are denied access to alternative civilian service may be prosecuted under Article 461, part 1, of the Criminal Code. This offense is punishable by a prison sentence of two to five years.

[3] For example, in Papavasilakis v. Greece, the ECtHR found that required procedural safeguards were not in place. In this case the applicant was interviewed by a board consisting of military personnel, and the final decision, based on the board’s recommendations, was made by the Ministry of Justice. The Court held that this procedure did not include safeguards of impartiality and independence.

[4] See Case N: ՏԴ/0044/01/19, https://datalex.am:443/?app=AppCaseSearch&case_id=32369622321755362; Case N: ԵԴ/0514/01/19, https://datalex.am:443/?app=AppCaseSearch&case_id=45880421203956612.